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COMPETITION INTO LoCAL TELEPHONE NETWORKS
Henry H. Bartlett
"Today our world is being remade ... thanks to the
scientific and entrepreneurial genius of American
workers in this country, it has created vast, vast opportu-
nities to enrich ourselves in body and in spirit ... But
the revolution has been held back by outdated laws,
designed for a time when there was one phone com-
pany, three TV networks, no such thing as a personal
computer. Today, with the stroke of a pen, our laws
will catch up with the future. We will help create an
open marketplace where competition and innovation
can move as quickly as light."'
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996
Act")2 was enacted as a dramatic and thorough
overhaul of the Communications Act of 1934.3
The 1996 Act was intended to promote competi-
tion and reduce regulation in order to secure
lower prices for American telecommunications
I President Bill Clinton, Remarks at the signing of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Feb. 9, 1996).
2 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West Supp.
1996)). The opening paragraph of the 1996 Act states it is
"[a]n act to promote competition and reduce regulation in
order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for
American telecommunications consumers and encourage
rapid deployment of telecommunications technologies." Id.
3 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994). The purpose of the Communi-
cations Act of 1934 was "to make available . . . to all the peo-
ple of the United States a rapid, efficient, nation-wide and
world-wide wire and radio communications service . .. for the
purpose of securing a more effective, execution of this pol-
icy." Id.
4 See generally 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West Supp. 1996). See
also Federal Communications Commission Chairman Reed
Hundt, Speech at the Antitrust Conference for Corporate General
Counsels at 1 (Nov. 8, 1996).
5 See, e.g., A Hearing on H.R. 1555: Communications Act of
1995, Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm., House Comm. on Com-
merce, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess., (statements of Bob Boaldin,
President of Elkhart Telephone and first Vice-Chairman of
the United States Telephone Association), No. 104-34, May
10-12, 1995. Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General,
Antitrust Division, Department of Commerce, and Bradley
Stillman, Telecommunications Policy Director, Consumer
Federation of America, at 180, 219, 336.
6 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(d) (1) (West Supp. 1996). Section
251 of the 1996 Act states that it is the general duty of each
telecommunications carrier "to interconnect directly or indi-
rectly with the facilities and equipment of other telecommu-
customers and deploy new telecommunications
technologies.4 In this endeavor, Congress solic-
ited comments from the telecommunications in-
dustry, regulatory authorities and the public
before enacting the 1996 Act.5 One hotly debated
provision of the 1996 Act mandates the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") to pro-
mulgate regulations within six months to promote
interconnection between local exchange carriers
("LECs") and any requesting telecommunications
carriers.6
Upon issuance of the FCC's August 8, 1996,
First Report and Order7 on interconnection,
more than thirty-five petitioners,8 led by the Iowa
nications carriers; and not to install network features, func-
tions or capabilities that do not comply with the guidelines
and standards established pursuant to section 255 and 256."
Id. at § 251 (a) (1-2).
7 See generally Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Re-
port and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15505 (1996) [hereinafter First
Report and Order]. The introduction to the First Report and
Order states that under the 1996 Act, the "[FCC] and the
states [will] remove the outdated barriers that protect mo-
nopolies from competition and affirmatively promote effi-
cient competition using tools forged by Congress. Histori-
cally, regulation of this industry has been premised on the
belief that service could be provided at the lowest cost to the
maximum number of customers through a regulated monop-
oly network. The 1996 Act adopts precisely the opposite ap-
proach. Rather than shielding telephone companies from
competition, the 1996 Act requires telephone companies to
open their networks to competition." Id. at para. 1.
8 The complete list of petitioners includes Iowa Utilities
Board, The Southern New England Telephone Company,
Bell Atlantic Corporation, Ameritech Corporation, U.S.
West, Inc., GTE Service Corporation (consisting of GTE
Alaska, Inc., GTE Arkansas, Inc., GTE California, Inc., GTE
Florida, Inc., GTE Midwest, Inc., GTE South, Inc., GTE
Southwest, Inc., GTE North, Inc., GTE Northwest, Inc., GTE
Hawaiian Telephone Company, Inc., GTE West, Inc., Contel
of California, Inc., Contel of Minnesota, Inc. and Contel of
the South, Inc.), New York Telephone Company, Cincinnati
Bell Telephone Company, The Public Service Commission of
the State of New York, SBC Communications, Louisiana Pub-
lic Service Commission, Florida Public Service Commission,
251
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
Utilities Board and joined by organizations as di-
verse as GTE, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth and the
Florida and Louisiana Public Service Commis-
sions, filed for a stay of the interconnectivity pric-
ing provisions9 with the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit. The stay was requested pend-
ing judicial review of the pricing provisions of the
FCC's August 8, 1996 First Report and Order.'0
Although each petitioner had particular reasons
for joining the request for a stay the majority of
their concerns centered around the pricing
guidelines outlined by the FCC." The petitioners
believed that they would be unfairly burdened by
inadequate compensation paid to them by com-
petitors as directed by the new FCC pricing guide-
lines.12
After review of the petition, the Eighth Circuit
granted the stay on October 15, 1996, finding for
the petitioners that all requirements to grant a
stay were satisfied.13 The stay applies only to pro-
visions in the law regarding the FCC's pricing
South Dakota Public Utilities Commission, The Public Utili-
ties Commission of the State of California, United States Tel-
ephone Association, Rural Telephone Coalition, Competitive
Telecommunications Association and Mississippi Public Ser-
vice Commission. Iowa Util. Bd. v. FCC, 4 Comm. Reg. (P &
F) 1360 (8th Cir. 1996). All cases were consolidated by the
September 11, 1996 order of the Judicial Panel Multidistrict
Litigation Docket No. RTC-31, pursuant to Rule 24 of the
rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Liti-
gation. See 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (3) (1994).
9 Section 251 of the 1996 Act requires incumbent local
exchange carriers (incumbent LECs) to allow other telecom-
munications carriers to "interconnect" with the incumbent
LECs existing infrastructure to facilitate competition for lo-
cal telephone service. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 251 (West Supp.
1996). To this end, the FCC promulgated pricing rules
which require that state commissions use the "total long run
incremental cost" ("TELRIC") method to calculate the cost
an incumbent LEC incurs in making its infrastructure avail-
able. See First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. at 16217-18 (Ap-
pendix B-Final Rules §§ 51.503, 51.505). Using the TELRIC
method, the state commissions then determine the price an
incumbent LEC may charge its competitors. Id. Petitioners
object to the TELRIC method on two grounds: (1) the
method does not consider "historical" and "embedded" costs
the incumbent LECs have incurred in the past and (2) it as-
sumes that incumbent LECs are using the most efficient tech-
nology available regardless of what is actually being utilized
resulting in prices that are artificially low. Iowa Util. Bd., 4
Comm. Reg. (P & F) at 1362; see also First Report and Order, 11
FCC Rcd. at 16218. (Appendix B-Final Rules,
§ 51.505(b) (1)); see also supra note accompanying text 148.
Secondly, petitioners argue that the FCC's proxy rates which
are to be utilized if state commissions choose not to dictate
pricing guidelines based on the TELRIC method do not ac-
curately reflect their costs. Iowa Util. Bd., 4 Comm. Reg. (P&
F) at 1362; First Report and Order, supra note 7, at 16217-18, 21,
29 (Appendix B-Final Rules, §§ 51.503(b) (2), 51.513,
rules and the "pick and choose" rule contained in
the FCC's First Report and Order.14 The Eighth
Circuit heard oral arguments onJanuary 17, 1997,
and a final decision date has yet to be an-
nounced. 15 No matter how the Eighth Circuit
rules, the case is widely expected to be appealed
to the Supreme Court, where likely it will not be
heard until 1998.16
In the meantime, while the various players are
choose sides and allegiances, the public continues
to wait for the improvements anticipated when
the 1996 Act was passed - better telecommunica-
tions services with higher quality at better prices
for American consumers.' 7 One year later, as ba-
sic parts of the 1996 Act are litigated, the status
quo remains.' 8
In Section I, this Note will examine the history
of competition in the telephone industry. Section
II presents an overview of the debated intercon-
nection provisions of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996. Section III examines the FCC's First
51.705(a) (2), 51.707). Lastly, petitioners argue that any ne-
gotiated agreements would never be finally binding because
the FCC's "pick and choose" rule allows competitors to "pick
and choose" among the lowest priced individual elements
and services they need from a different approved agreements
with other carriers. For example, if Carrier A and an LEC
had reached an approved agreement and Carrier B made a
similar agreement and Carrier B had negotiated a lower
price for one of the elements or services provided by the
LEC, then Carrier A would be able to demand that its agree-
ment be modified to reflect the lower cost negotiated by Car-
rier B. Iowa Util. Bd., 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) at 1362; First
Report and Order, supra note 7, at 16,235 (Appendix B-Final
Rules, § 51.809).
10 See generally Iowa Util. Bd., 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1360.
See also Leslie Cauley, Court Delays Implementing FCC Rules To
Break Up Local Telephone Monopolies, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30,
1996, at A4.
11 See supra text accompanying note 9.
12 Id.
1s See infra text accompanying note 115.
14 Iowa Util. Bd., 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) at 1355-56.
15 Telecomm Roundtable, infra note 89, at 33, Comments
of William B. Barfield of BellSouth Corp.
16 Scott Ritter, Courts Expected to Deny Bid for More Rivalry
In the Local Markets, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 1996, at B9 (explain-
ing the comments of FCC Chairman Hundt that the FCC will
appeal the decision if the Eighth Circuit affirms the stay pro-
visions). See Frolio, infra note 78, at B14. The court's deci-
sion is not anticipated to resolve all of the issues arising
under the 1996 Act leaving open the possibility that the los-
ing party will seek certiorari. Id. at B15. AT&T and others
have asserted that the FCC regulations on appeal are deserv-
ing of review by the Supreme Court. Id.
17 See generally 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West Supp. 1996).
18 Bob Starzynski, Getting the Act Together, After Almost a
Year, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 has Yet to Deliver on its
Promise, WASH. BUs. J., Jan. 17, 1997.
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Report and Order including justifications for its
actions. Section IV details the stay by the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals, and Section VI debates
the question of whether the public interest has
been served by all of the preceding actions.
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF COMPETITION IN
THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY
Congress enacted the Communications Act of
1934 ("1934 Act") to regulate interstate communi-
cations and to assure universal provision of com-
munications services both interstate and interna-
tionally." The 1934 Act incorporated the
premise that telephone service was best served by
a single firm who could provide better and lower
cost services than competing suppliers. 20 It was
also intended to ensure that AT&T, who provided
the majority of telephone service, did not abuse
its power.2 ' Regulatory protection, however, "also
ensured that AT&T would remain a government-
sanctioned monopoly."2 2
The 1934 Act also created the FCC whose mis-
19 See supra note 3
20 See 141 CONG. REc. S7881 (daily ed. June 7, 1995)




24 See American Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 191 F.2d 492,
498 (D.C. Cir. 1951). "In performing its functions under
[the 1934] Act the Commission is given broad discretion ...
The purpose of Congress in establishing the Commission was
to set up an agency capable of coping with the ever-changing
and constantly-increasing problems of a booming industry."
Id.
25 See generally United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131
(D.D.C. 1982).
26 See 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1) (1994). See also Higgins and
Rubin, infra note 51, at xiv. The Communications Act of
1934 regulated AT&T profits through a technique known as
"continuing surveillance," which consisted of informal moni-
toring. This technique, born of an era in which rates were
declining due to productivity gains was to the satisfaction of
both AT&T and the FCC. The method changed in the late
1960s when the FCC prescribed a maximum allowed rate of
return. Daniel Kelley, DEREGULATION AFTER DIVESTITURE,
THE EFFECT OF THE AT&T SETTLEMENT ON COMPETITION
(FCC Office of Plans and Policy Working Paper Series, 1982)
at 16.
27 See Kelly, supra note 26, at 12 (explaining federal regu-
lation has focused on five broad areas: "rate of return, regu-
lation, tariff regulation of individual services, entry policies,
efforts to define the boundary between regulated and unreg-
ulated activities and deregulation of competitive carriers").
28 See generally 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
29 The Interstate Commerce Commission was granted
oversight of telephone regulation and other communications
sion was to provide regulatory guidance over the
emerging and increasingly specialized communi-
cations industry.23 The FCC was given broad dis-
cretionary power over wire and radio communica-
tions.24
Until 1984, the telephone system in the United
States operated under the "regulated monopoly"
concept.2 5 Rates for business and residential cus-
tomers were reserved for state and local govern-
ments. 26 Long distance fell under the purview of
the FCC,27 pursuant to authority granted by the
Communications Act of 193428 and previously
held by the Interstate Commerce Commission.29
The FCC and the states together shared the re-
sponsibility of cost allocation between local and
long distance use.30
Not comfortable with AT&T's monopoly on tel-
ephone services, the United States Department of
Justice ("DOJ") filed suit in 1949 in federal dis-
trict court against AT&T and its subsidiary, West-
ern Electric,3 ' for alleged violations of Sections 1,
2 and 3 of the Sherman Anti-trust Act.32 The DOJ
sought to sever the connection between Western
carriers by the Mann-Elkins Act. See generally Mann-Elkins Act
of 1910, ch. 309 § 7, 36 Stat. 544-45.
30 See, e.g., Kelley, supra note 26, at 12-13 (explaining
both state and federal regulators have an interest in the size
of local facilities and its allocation, depreciation rates and the
expenses of individual telephone companies allocated to the
federal jurisdiction are determined by the "separations" pro-
cess and allocation of local exchange investment).
3' See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 135
(D.D.C. 1982). Before the break-up of the AT&T monopoly
in 1984, Western Electric was a wholly owned subsidiary of
AT&T whose purpose was to manufacture telecommunica-
tions equipment for AT&T's other divisions. Id. at 135 n.3.
Western Electric also provided telecommunications equip-
ment and services to government agencies and to independ-
ent telephone companies. Id.
32 See id. at 135-36. The purpose of the Sherman Act is to
prevent undue restraints of interstate commerce, to maintain
the appropriate freedom in public interest, and to offer pro-
tection from subversive or coercive influences of monopolis-
tic endeavor. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1994). The views of Sena-
tor Sherman (R-OH) are expressed in the following passage
describing the case against monopolistic mergers and preda-
tory practices: "The sole object of such a combination is to
make competition impossible ... [s]uch a combination is far
more dangerous than any heretofore invented, and, when it
embraces the great body of all the corporations engaged in a
particular industry in all the States of the Union, it tends to
advance the price to the consumer of any article produced, it
is a substantial monopoly injurious to the public . . . and the
individuals engaged in it should be punished as criminals."
21 CONG. REc. 2457 (1890). See, e.g., Appalachian Coals, Inc.
v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933), Fedderson Motors v.
Ward, 180 F.2d 519, 521 (D.D.C. 1950) (explaining the inter-
pretation by the court of the Sherman Act).
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Electric and AT&T.3 3  Significant pressure by
AT&T and its allies in the United States Depart-
ment of Defense34s stalled resolution of the case.35
A consent decree, which did not come until 1956,
between AT&T and the DOJ allowed the monop-
oly to remain in place.36
A series of antitrust lawsuits continued to be
filed over the course of the 1960s and 1970s by
various competitors who sought to compete with
AT&T, particularly in the long-distance market.37
The suits were generally resolved through injunc-
tive relief which constrained some AT&T activ-
ity.3  The petitioners enjoyed modest success, but
AT&T's monopoly remained neatly intact.
On November 20, 1974, the DOJ again filed suit
against AT&T, Western Electric and Bell Labora-
33 See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 136.
3 Id. at 136-37. Then Secretary of Defense Robert A.
Lovett and other members of the Department of Defense
met with the president of Bell Laboratories, Dr. M.J. Kelly in
February 28, 1952. Kelly sought their help in persuading the
Justice Department to suspend prosecution until the end of
the Korean War. Lovett requested the postponement in a
letter to the Attorney General dated March 20, 1952. Id. at
136. "Indefinite postponement was requested by the Defense
Department despite the fact that neither Mr. Lovett. . .nor
anyone else in the Department had made an independent
investigation to determine whether trial of the suit would ac-
tually impede the mobilization effort or whether Bell System
personnel working on defense matters would actually be
needed for preparation of trial of the case." Id. at 136 n.9
citing Report of the Antitrust Subcommittee of the Department ofjus-
tice, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., Jan. 30, 1959 at 47.
35 Id. at 137.
36 Id. at 137-138. As part of the consent decree, AT&T
agreed to provide only common carrier communications
services and Western Electric agreed to the manufacture of
equipment other than that used by the Bell System (the local
carrier for the AT&T network). Id. at 138.
37 See, e.g., Carterphone v. AT&T, 13 F.C.C.2d 571
(1968). The Carterphone decision allowed interconnection
of privately supplied terminal equipment directly to the net-
work. See generally id. Entry restrictions in the interstate
transmission market via microwave frequencies by companies
other than AT&T were first reduced with the Above 890 de-
cree. See generally Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands
Above 890 Mc, 27 F.C.C. 359 (1959). See M.C.I. Telecomm.
Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977). New entrants
were given authority to provide a full spectrum of interstate,
interexchange services, including a shared private line ser-
vice that resembled AT&T's MTS/WATS services. See also
Bendix Aviation Corp. v. FCC, 272 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
AT&T responded to these new entries into the long distance
arena by lowering prices for private line services. The FCC's
First Computer Inquiry held that new data communications
should not be regulated. See generally In re Regulatory and
Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Com-
puter and Communications Services and Facilities, 28
F.C.C.2d 267 (1971). The Second Computer Inquiry deter-
mined that all customer premises equipment should be un-
regulated; it also adopted certain accounting and structural
tories39 alleging a violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Anti-trust Act by monopolizing activities
within telecommunications services. 40 Among
other things, the Justice Department sought com-
plete divestiture of the Bell Operating Companies
("BOCs") 41 from AT&T, thereby erasing AT&T's
monopoly control of local service.
After several years of delay tactics and discovery
motions, the trial was held in the District of Co-
lumbia on January 15, 1981, before United States
District Court Judge Harold Greene.4 2 A pro-
posed consent decree between the parties was
submitted to the court in 1982, modified by Judge
Greene, negotiated over the next two years and
finally embodied as the Modified Final Judgment
("MFJ").43 The MFJ separated the BOCs" from
separation requirements and required AT&T to form a
wholly separate subsidiary to offer any unregulated services
or equipment. See generally In re Amendment of Sections
64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, 77
F.C.C.2d 384 (1980). The Third Computer Inquiry sought struc-
tural separation by classifying combined telecommunications
and data processing services as "basic" or "enhanced." See
generally Third Computer Inquiry I, 104 F.C.C.2d at 968.
38 See Peter Temin, The MJF: An Imperfect Solution, in DER-
EGULATING COMMUNICATIONS, THE BABY BELLS CASE FOR COM-
PETITIONt 3 (Richard S. Higgins and Paul H. Rubin eds.,
1995).
39 Bell Telephone Laboratories was AT&T's telecommu-
nications research and development facility which was jointly
owned by AT&T and Western Electric, each owning 50% of
the stock. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 136
n.6 (D.D.C. 1982).
40 Id. at 139. DOJ sued AT&T for: (1) exploitation of its
"bottleneck" monopoly in local services to give it an advan-
tage in long distance, equipment and information markets;
(2) overcharging other firms for interconnection to the Bell
System; and (3) cross-subsidizing its competitive services by
shifting costs to noncompetitive regulated markets, thereby
allowing it to set prices below costs in its competitive markets
and to force rivals, including those with low costs, to with-
draw. Id. at 139 n.18. See also supra note 32 and accompany-
ing text.
41 See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 139. The Bell Operating
Companies, the majority of which were wholly owned by
AT&T, provide the means by which local telephone service is
furnished. See id. at 139 n.19.
42 See id. at 140. After opening arguments, the trial was
recessed for six weeks to afford an opportunity for a negoti-
ated settlement. The negations yielded no useful result and
the trial was resumed on March 4, 1981. Id. The magnitude
of the evidence presented was immense. Between both par-
ties, more than 350 witnesses and tens of thousands of pages
of documents were offered into evidence. Id.
43 Id. at 225-26. See also Higgins and Rubin, infra note 51,
at xiv. The MFJ called for the following:
(1) AT&T would divest itself of its of its twenty-two local
BOCs which would be regrouped under seven regional
holding companies (RBOCs) by January 1, 1984.
(2) The BOCs would by allowed monopoly service
within 161 newly formed local access and service areas
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AT&T, and set specific paths to effect the transi-
tion from monopoly to a regulated environment
including both AT&T and the BOCs.45 Certain
line-of-business restrictions were also imposed;4
AT&T was prohibited from providing local ex-
change services and the BOCs were prohibited
from offering long-distance service. 4 7
In approving the MFJ, Judge Greene clearly
wanted to promote competition, and introduced
it into areas he found technically feasible, most
notably the long-distance market.48 The BOCs
(generally referred to as the local exchange carri-
ers or LECs), however, controlled a network of in-
(LATAs). Inter-LATA service would be provided by long
distance carriers (AT&T and any new competitors).
(3) AT&T would provide all other interexchange carri-
ers and information providers access to its network of
equal quality, type and price.
(4) The 22 BOCs and their respective RBOCs would not
manufacture equipment nor would they discriminate in
equipment procurement.
(5) AT&T would retain Bell Labs and Western Electric.
(6) The RBOCs would retain control of the Yellow
Pages.
(7) The RBOCs would retain the "Bell" trademark
rights, but AT&T could do so only in connection with
Bell Labs.
(8) The RBOCS were allowed to enter unregulated
competitive lines of business where the court deter-
mined they could not exercise their monopoly power.
(9) AT&T was allowed to enter information services and
other markets outside of regulated communications.
Marcellus S. Snow, The AT&T divestiture: a 10-year retrospec-
tive, in BEYOND COMPETITION: THE FUTURE OF TELECOMMUNI-
CATIONS at 211-12 (D. Lamberton ed. 1995).
44 At the time the case was decided, the BOCs consisted
of 22 entities: Bell Telephone Company of Nevada, Illinois
Bell Telephone Company, Indiana Bell Telephone Com-
pany, Inc., Michigan Bell Telephone Company, New England
Telephone and Telegraph Company, New Jersey Bell Tele-
phone Company, New York Telephone Company, Northwest-
ern Bell telephone Company, Pacific Northwest Bell Tele-
phone Company, South Central Bell Telephone and
Telegraph Company, Southwestern Bell Telephone Com-
pany, The Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania, The
Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company, The Chesa-
peake and Potomac Telephone Company of Maryland, , The
Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of Virginia,
The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of West
Virginia, The Diamond State Telephone Company, The
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company, The
Ohio Bell Telephone Company, The Pacific Telephone and
Telegraph Company and Wisconsin Telephone Company.
Id. at 232 (Appendix A). These 22 entities were reorganized
into seven regional BOCs (RBOCs): NYNEX, Pacific Telesis,
SBC Communications, U.S. West, Bell South, Ameritech and
Bell Atlantic. James E. Meadows, Telecommunications Law in
the Age of Convergence, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER LAw 201, 205 (June 17, 1996).
45 See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 223. The court mandated
that not later than six months after the effective date of the
MFJ, AT&T shall submit a plan that would include the follow-
frastructure which at the time represented a pro-
hibitive barrier to competition on the local
level.49 The MFJ was not intended to be perma-
nent and Judge Greene retained jurisdiction over
the matter to modify and enforce the MFJ and the
reorganization plan.5 0 The MFJ was meant only
to remain in place long enough to allow competi-
tion to flourish and not beyond the date when the
local exchange markets could be subject to com-
petition.51 By 1994 conditions and technology
had changed substantially, and several BOCs peti-
tioned Judge Greene to vacate the MFJ in its en-
tirety.52
ing steps:
(1) The transfer from AT&T and its affiliates to the
BOCs or its new owners all facilities, information and
personnel that would allow the BOC to perform inde-
pendently of AT&T and meet the equal access require-
ments.
(2) The separation within the BOCs of all facilities per-
sonnel and books of account between those relating to
the exchange telecommunications, exchange access
functions and other functions provided that there shall
be no joint ownership of facilities.
(3) The termination of the License Contracts between
AT&T and the BOCs and other subsidiaries and the
Standard Supply Contract between Western Electric and
the BOCs and other subsidiaries.
(4) The transfer of ownership of the separated portions
of the BOCs providing local exchange and exchange ac-
cess services from AT&T by means of a spin-off of stock
of the separated BOCs to the shareholders of AT&T pro-
vided that nothing shall require or prohibit consolida-
tion of ownership of the BOCs.
Id. at 226-227. The BOCs were also required to provide,
through a centralized organization, a single point of contact
for coordination of BOCs to meet the requirements of na-
tional security and emergency preparedness. See id. at 227.
46 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
47 See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 226-27 (Modification of Fi-
nal Judgment).
48 Id. at 223. Judge Green lifted previous line-of-business
restrictions on AT&T and permitted them to enter the "grow-
ing computer, computer related, and information market."
Id. He commented that all of the developments of the case
were "plainly in the public interest." Id. AT&T was, however,
prohibited from entering the electronic publishing industry
due to the potential of AT&T to acquire a substantial monop-
oly over the generation of news which would strike at a prin-
ciple which lies at the heart of the First Amendment. Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 231.
51 Richard S. Higgins and Paul H. Rubin, An Overview of
the Costs and Benefits of the AT&T Antitrust Settlement, in DER-
EGULATING COMMUNICATIONS, THE BABY BELLS CASE FOR COM-
PETITION (Richard S. Higgins and Paul H. Rubin eds. 1995).
52 Id. at xvi. The BOCs argued that there was a substan-
tial cost to customers by not allowing the BOCs competitive
entry into the long distance market and, on the other hand,
there is no longer a significant risk of "monopoly leveraging"
or "cross subsidization" by the BOCs. Id.
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II. THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT
OF 1996
A. Overview of Local Interconnectivity
Provisions
Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 on February 8, 1996 ("1996 Act") "to pro-
mote competition and reduce regulation in order
to secure lower prices, higher quality services for
American telecommunications consumers and en-
courage the rapid deployment of new telecommu-
nications technologies."5 3 Where specified, the
1996 Act supersedes the Communications Act of
1934, which represented Congress' first attempt
to provide for the installation and regulation of a
widely accessible, reasonably priced communica-
tions infrastructure in the United States. 54 The
1996 Act is comprehensive, addressing everything
from interconnection and the BOCs' entry into
the long distance market55 to number parity,
broadcast services, cable services, regulatory re-
form, obscenity and violence in the media.56
The 1996 Act specifically encouraged "rapid
employment of new telecommunications technol-
ogies."5 7 Congress acknowledges in the opening
paragraph of the 1996 Act that the pace of tech-
nological developments and breakthroughs has
created new markets, new products and services
and that access should be easily obtained across
the spectrum of providers and users.58
53 See generally 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West Supp. 1996).
54 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994). Section 151 codifies the Com-
munications Act of 1934 and creates the FCC whose purpose
is "to make available . . . to all the people of the United States
a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and worldwide wire and com-
munication service . . ." Id.
55 See generally, Michael F. Finn, The Public Interest and Bell
Entry Into Long Distance Under Section 271 of the Communications
Act, 5 COMMLAw CONSPECTUS 203 (1997) (explaining the
BOCs must meet a fourteen point checklist on competition
before being allowed to compete in long-distance market-
place).
56 See generally 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West Supp. 1996).
57 Id..
58 Id.
59 Id. § 251(c) (2). Specifically, interconnection means
the duty for a local exchange carrier to provide connection
with any requesting carrier's network transmission and rout-
ing of exchange service and access, "at any technically feasi-
ble point within the carrier's network," equal in quality to its
own service or to service it provides others, and at rates which
are 'just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory.' Id.
60 Id. § 251(a) (1). This provision is further refined by
the requirement to connect at "any technically feasible point
within the carrier's network." See also infra note 148 and ac-
companying text.
In its discussion of developing competitive mar-
kets, the first substantive item addressed by Con-
gress is interconnection.5 9 The 1996 Act defines
interconnection as the duty of every telecommu-
nications carrier "to interconnect directly or indi-
rectly with the facilities and equipment of other
telecommunications carriers."6 0 Specifically, the
1996 Act directs local exchange carriers ("LECs")
to provide such interconnectivity with the same
quality they enjoy and the same equipment they
use, at rates which are just, reasonable and non-
discriminatory.6' Interconnection is to be imple-
mented through "the duty [of each LEC] to nego-
tiate in good faith."6 2
The second provision is the mandate for un-
bundled access, which is the duty of LECs to pro-
vide to any requesting telecommunications carrier
access to any, or all, parts of its network as are
technically feasible, so that the parts may be
recombined by the requesting telecommunica-
tions carrier to provide its own telecommunica-
tions service.63
The final disputed provision of the 1996 Act is
the duty of the LECs to offer for resale any tele-
communications service that the carrier provides
at retail to subscribers. 6 4 They are obliged to of-
fer these services to other telecommunications
carriers at wholesale rates, excepting some over-
sight by state commissions where applicable.65
61 Id. § 251(c) (2) (d). This provision also stipulates that
the terms and conditions for interconnection set by carriers
comply with Section 252, which outlines procedures to be
used for negotiation of agreements, arbitration, and approval
of agreements. Id. § 252.
62 Id. § 251(c) (1). Upon receiving a request for inter-
connection, services, or network elements pursuant to Sec-
tion 251, an incumbent LEC may "negotiate and enter into a
binding agreement with the requesting telecommunications
carrier or carriers . . . the agreement shall be submitted to
the State's commission." Id. § 252(a)(1).
63 Id. § 251(c) (3). Unbundled access is to be provided at
"rates, terms and conditions that are just, reasonable and
nondiscriminatory" to any requesting telecommunications
carrier, and also in accordance with the provisions of Section
252. Id.
64 Id. §§ 251(c) (1)-(6). Not only must carriers provide
their services to other telecommunications carriers at whole-
sale rates, but they may not thwart or limit the resale of such
services to others, except as directed by a State commission
regarding a particular category of subscribers. Id.
65 Id. § 251(c)(4)(B). A State commission may prohibit
a carrier which obtains services at wholesale rates from offer-
ing those services to a category of customers which previously
only received them at retail rates, if such prohibition is con-
sistent with the regulations by the FCC. Id.
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B. Implementation and Role of Federal and
State Commissions
Congress mandated the FCC to "complete all
actions necessary to establish regulations to imple-
ment the requirements" of the law within six
months of February 8, 1996.66 The FCC was given
specific authority to determine how to develop ac-
cess standards,67 but state access regulations were
also recognized and upheld, wherever they do not
conflict.68 Pricing of various services is specifically
not mentioned in this section of the 1996 Act.
Congress did, however, specify a rather intricate
arrangement whereby carriers requesting inter-
connection services or network elements would
negotiate voluntarily with the LECs to enter into a
binding agreement covering itemized charges for
interconnection and each service or network ele-
ment included.69 It also provided for compulsory
arbitration by state commissions for disputes,70
determining, among other things, time frames for
responses.7' Under the section concerning "stan-
dards for arbitration," Congress clearly states that
"[A] state commission shall . .. establish any rates
for interconnection, services, or network ele-
ments." 72
Furthermore, when specifically discussing pric-
ing standards, the 1996 Act refers to "determina-
tions by a state commission of the just and reason-
able rate for the interconnection of facilities and
66 Id. § 251 (d) (1).
67 Id. § 251(d) (2). At a minimum, the FCC is to consider
both the proprietary nature of the network elements in-
volved, and whether failure to provide access would impair
the requesting carrier's ability to provide services it wants to
offer. Id.
68 Id. § 251(d) (3). Wherever a State commission has
proscribed access and interconnection obligations of a local
exchange carrier, and the State commission's regulations are
consistent with and do not prevent the implementation of
the 1996 Act, its rules remain in effect. Id.
69 Id. § 252(a) (1). Although the negotiation is volun-
tary, should a dispute arise, a State commission may mediate
any differences, if requested by either party. Id. § 252 (a) (2).
70 Id. § 252(a) (2). Between the 135th and 160th day af-
ter the LEC has received a request for negotiation, any party
to the negotiation may petition the State commission to arbi-
trate open issues. Id.
71 Id. § 252(b) (3). The non-petitioning party may re-
spond within 25 days after petition has been made to the
State commission. Id.
72 Id. § 252(b) (5) (c). The State commission is responsi-
ble to ensure that conditions of any dispute resolution meet
the requirements of the law, including rates and implementa-
tion schedule. Id.
73 Id. § 252(d) (1). The State commissions are directed
to set rates which (1) are based on cost of providing intercon-
equipment."73 The references to "state commis-
sions" and their authority continue under sections
about "charges for transport and termination of
traffic" and "wholesale prices for telecommunica-
tions services."74 Ostensibly, the only way the
states' commissions lose their authority is when
they refuse to act within the specified time frame
of ninety days.75 At that point the FCC assumes
the authority of the state commission not acting
and the FCC being so notified.76
Due to the rapid advances in technology and
the need to secure lower prices and higher quality
for American telecommunications consumers,
Congress stated a clear intent to promote compe-
tition in enacting the Telecommunications Act of
1996.7 Although it tasked the FCC with the 1996
Act's implementation, Congress also acknowl-
edged the state commissions' continuing author-
ity over pricing issues.78
III. FIRST REPORT AND ORDER - THE
FCC'S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE




The FCC, in its First Report and Order,7 9
nection or network elements, (2) are nondiscriminatory and
(3) may include a reasonable profit.
74 Id. § 252 (d) (2)-(3).
75 Id. § 252(e) (5). Even when the FCC preempts the
State commission because of the State commission's failure
to respond within the time frame prescribed, the FCC's au-
thority is limited to the particular proceeding or matter at
hand, not the State commission's authority in other areas.
Id.
76 Id.
7 See generally 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West Supp. 1996).
78 David G. Frolio, Phone Competition Order Gets Hung Up
in Litigation; Mammoth 8th Circuit Suit May Foreshadow Long
Wars Over FCC'S Interconnection Rules, Jan. 20, 1997 NAT'L L.J.
at B14. See contra, A bipartisan group of members from the
House Commerce Committee (including John H. Dingell
(D-MI) and incoming Telecommunications Subcommittee
chairman Billy Tauzin, R-La.) filed an amicus curiae brief
with the Eighth Circuit characterizing the FCC's interconnec-
tion order as "an act of extraordinary arrogance" and states
the FCC "had taken a perfectly legible statute and turned it
on its head." Id. The brief is especially critical of the FCC
provisions allowing new entrants to "rebundle" network ele-
ments at wholesale prices into telecommunications services.
Id.
79 See First Report and Order, supra note 7.
1997] 257
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
promulgated rules to address the areas mandated
by Congress in the 1996 Act8 o and discusses and
defends the depth of change now legislated.81
The underlying concept is one of moving from a
government-encouraged monopolistic structure
for the local telephone industry to a competitive
environment.8 2 The First Report and Order ac-
knowledges the important roles that the state
commissions have historically played in regulating
the telecommunications industry, and then an-
nounces the creation of a "new partnership be-
tween state and federal regulators . . . [one] far
better suited to the coming world of competi-
tion."8 3 In outlining the new goals set out by Con-
gress, the FCC assumes authority over areas specif-
ically designated as within the purview of the
states, although it "looks forward to the continua-
tion of that cooperative working relationship in
the coming months as each of [them] carries out
the role assigned by the 1996 Act."84 The areas of
greatest contention are the interconnectivity pro-
visions, the unbundling provisions, and most of
all, the pricing provisions. 5
Among the FCC's principal goals for imple-
menting Congress' mandate for telephone service
are: (1) opening the local exchange and access
markets to competitors, (2) promoting more com-
petition in markets already open to competition,
including long distance and (3) reconfiguring the
market so that universal service is preserved and
80 Id at para. 1. The opening paragraph proclaims the
1996 Act as a new direction which fundamentally changes
telecommunications regulation. Under the old regulatory
scheme, government encouraged monopolies were en-
couraged. Under the new scheme, "we and the states remove
the outdated barriers that protect monopolies from competi-
tion and affirmatively promote efficient competition using
tools forged by Congress." Id.
81 See Frolio infra note 78. The FCC's First Report and
Order is comprehensive and purports to regulate in fine de-
tail all aspects of competition in the local-exchange market.
Id. at 2. The text is massive, spanning over 700 pages and
including a staggering 3,276 footnotes. Id.
82 See First Report and Order, supra note 7, at para. 1.
83 Id. See Frolio, infra note 78. The petitioners in Iowa
Utilities Bd. argue that intrastate rates historically were under
the purview of the State commission and the FCC's pricing
authority extends only to interstate communications and that
the 1996 Act preserved this allocation of responsibility. Id.
The FCC defends itself on statutory and policy grounds, that
the 1996 Act supersedes the historical allocation of jurisdic-
tion and that the 1996 Act encompasses the authority to set
local rates. Id. The FCC contends that the 1996 Act also ex-
pands the applicability of state rules to historically interstate
issues. See First Report and Order, supra note 7, at para. 24.
84 Id. at para. 2. The FCC declares "this arrangement is
advanced while the local markets transition from
monopoly to competition. 6 The FCC contends
that competition is desirable, not only because of
the social and economic benefits competition
brings to consumers of local service, but also be-
cause competition eventually will eliminate the
ability of an incumbent local exchange carrier to
control the local facilities and impede free market
competition. 7
In addressing these goals, the FCC leapfrogs
several steps in the process outlined in the 1996
Act by creating a new system of pricing, presuma-
bly in an effort to arrive at the desired competitive
environment before either players or the techno-
logical infrastructure are in place. 8 The attempt
is to simplify the pricing structure, but the FCC's
methodologies have led to an unprecedented
level of litigation in both state and, increasingly,
federal courts. 9
B. Justification for FCC's Actions
The FCC sees itself as playing a critical role be-
cause the removal of statutory and regulatory bar-
riers to entry into the local exchange and ex-
change access markets which, while necessary to
foster competition, is not sufficient to ensure that
competition will supplant the BOCs' monopo-
lies.90 An LEC enjoys a unique position with re-
gard to the market it serves because its existing
far better suited to the coming world of competition in which
historical regulatory distinctions are supplanted by competi-
tive forces." Id.
85 See generally Iowa Util. Bd., 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
1360.
86 First Report and Order, supra note 7, at para. 3.
87 Id. The FCC's intent is to remove not only statutory
and regulatory impediments to competition but also eco-
nomic and operational impediments while maintaining and
advancing universal service. Id.
88 See generally 47 U.S.C.A. at §§ 251 and 252 (West Supp.
1996).
89 ModeratorJoseph R. Bankoff, Telecom Act Forces Counsel
to Toe the Line, CORP. LEGAL TIMES 29 (Dec. 1996) [hereinafter
Telecomm Roundtable]. "I use a matrix to keep track of who's
filed and what's happening. Moving to intervene in all of
them is a huge task. By my last count, more than 130 arbitra-
tion petitions had been filed against BOCs in all but six
states." Comments of Ellen A. D'Amato, vice president, ex-
ternal affairs for Sprint Corp. Id. at 32. See also Arbitration
Filings Mount for Interconnection Under 1996 Communications
Act, 7 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION 151 (1996).
90 Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96-
98, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 96-182, 61 Fed. Reg.
(Apr. 25, 1996).
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infrastructure allows it to service new customers at
a lower cost than any new competitor to that local
market could.9 1 The newcomer, without the help
of the interconnection rules, would be forced to
create its own infrastructure, in effect doubling
what is already in place in the existing LEC's sys-
tem.9 2 Furthermore, without interconnection be-
tween the two systems, calls placed in one compet-
itor's system to a second competitor's system must
be able to be completed in the second competi-
tor's system.93 The FCC correctly asserts an in-
cumbent LEC has little economic incentive to
help newcomers to enter its market and take away
part of its market share; it would more than likely
charge unreasonable rates or refuse to connect a
competitor at all.9 4 Despite these economic barri-
ers, Congress directed that these barriers to com-
petition be eliminated.95
Having laid this groundwork, the FCC inserts it-
self, perhaps in ways unanticipated by Congress,
by trying to level the playing field for new compet-
itors to local markets. The FCC states that there
will be several paths of entry into new markets by
competitors - "construction of new networks, the
use of unbundled elements of the incumbent's
network, and resale."96 The FCC outlines many of
the specifics of how the 1996 Act is to be imple-
mented and reserves the authority to review and
update the rules as technology advances.97
The provisions which have led to the majority
of litigation are the pricing methodologies for in-
91 See First Report and Order, supra note 7, at para. 10.
92 Id. (explaining that the incremental cost to a facilities-
based entrant would be higher than the incumbent LEC be-
cause the newcomer would need to install its own switches,
trunk and loops to serve customers).
93 Id.
94 Telecomm Roundtable, supra note 89, comments of Jo-
seph R. Bankoff at 34. See First Report and Order, supra note 7,
at § I(c) (10) (explaining that the incumbent LEC on its own
initiative has the ability to discourage entry and therefore
competition by either not interconnecting its network to the
newcomer's network or by charging "supracompetitive"
prices or unreasonable conditions for terminating calls from
the entrant's customers).
95 See First Report and Order, supra note 7, at para. 12.
96 Id. at para. 12.
97 Id. at para. 6. "Given the dynamic nature of telecom-
munications technology and markets, it will be necessary over
time to review proactively and adjust these rules to insure
both that the statute's mandate of competition is effectuated
and enforced, and that regulatory burdens are lifted as soon
as competition eliminates the need for them." Id.
98 See generally MCI Comm. Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081
(7th Cir. 1983). MCI made a predatory pricing claim against
AT&T. The 7th Circuit ruled against this claim by referring
terconnection and unbundled elements. The first
debated provision is the FCC determination that
the Total Element Long-Run Incremental Cost
("TELRIC") method, plus a reasonable share of
forward looking 8 joint and common costs was the
most reasonable way for newcomers to compen-
sate the LECs for interconnection.99 Using this
method, the state commissions should determine
how risk-adjusted cost of capital and depreciation
will affect rates.100 However, where states are un-
able to make such a determination within the
mandated statutory time frame, the FCC set "de-
fault" ceilings and ranges for states to use in the
interim. 0 1 These pricing elements have become
de facto standards.10 2 The First Report and Order
also establishes default ceiling for the other un-
bundled network elements. 0 3
Second, the FCC also expressly acted to reduce
the possibility that LECs might "double recover"
charges for universal access from its new competi-
tors while selling that same access as part of the
LECs' unbundling of network elements.' 0 4 This
was accomplished by setting a timetable to phase
out the previously used access charges and phase
in the unbundled network elements charges by
June 30, 1997 or the date of final decisions by the
FCC in the universal service and access reform
proceedings. 05 It also specifies a similar timeta-
ble for ending the LEC's recovery of intrastate ac-
cess charges and transport across their systems
while transitioning to the newer unbundled local
with approval to AT&T's costs on a forward looking basis.
"[I]t is current and anticipated cost, rather than historical
cost, that is relevant in business decisions to enter markets
and price products. The business manager makes a decision
to enter a new market by comparing anticipated revenues (at
a particular price) with anticipated additional costs . . . The
historical costs associated with the plant already in place are
essentially irrelevant to this decision since those costs are
'sunk' and unavoidable and are unaffected by new produc-
tion decisions." Id. at 1116-17.
99 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
100 See First Report and Order, supra note 7, at para. 29 (ex-
plaining that the FCC concluded that the State commissions
should set arbitrated rates for interconnection and access to





104 Id. at para. 30 (explaining that incumbent LECs will
recover from new entrants for all intrastate minutes travers-
ing in the incumbent LEC's local switches for which the new
entrants pay unbundled network element charges).
105 Id. at para. 30, 31.
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switching elements. 0 6
Third, the FCC set a 17-25% discount range off
retail prices for resale of telecommunications serv-
ices to those who are not carriers. 0 7 The FCC
notes that "resale will be an important entry strat-
egy both in the short term for many new entrants
as they build out their own facilities and for small
businesses that cannot afford to compete in the
local exchange market." 0 In establishing these
so-called "interim" rates for states unable, or un-
willing, to set their own rates, the FCC has created
a protective ceiling for any competitor wanting to
enter the market. Even in a negotiated settle-
ment, no competitor will pay more than what any
other competitor pays; in other words, a better
(from the LEC's standpoint) settlement will never
be attainable. 09
Taken together, these three major FCC goals
have proven so controversial that arbitration is
pending in every state in this country, 110 with pri-
vate companies and public commissions on the
same side in many cases, because the FCC has
seemingly overstepped its authority in attempting
106 Id.
107 Leslie Cauley and Bryan Gruley, Telecommunications:
Baby Bells Win Possible Delay Of Competition, WALL ST.J. Oct. 16,
1996, at BI, B9.
108 See First Report and Order, supra note 7, at para. 32.
109 Iowa Util. Bd., 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) at 1362, 1363.
Negotiated agreements would never be finally binding be-
cause the FCC's "pick and choose" rule allows competitors to
"pick and choose" among the lowest priced individual ele-
ments and services they need from a different approved
agreements with other carriers. For example, if Carrier A and
an LEC had reached an approved agreement and Carrier B
made a similar agreement. If Carrier B had negotiated a
lower price for one of the elements or services provided by
the LEC, Carrier A would be able to demand that its agree-
ment be modified to reflect the lower cost negotiated by Car-
rier B. Id.
110 See Cauley and Gruley supra note 107, at B9. More
than 180 state arbitrations are under way which could poten-
tially draw out the process considerably. Id.
111 Phone Firms'Bid Halt to New Rules Denied by FCC, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 18, 1996, at B8.
112 Iowa Util. Bd., 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) at 1361. See gen-
erally, Leslie Cauley, Court Delays Implementing FCC Rules To
Break Up Local Phone Monopolies, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30,1996, at
A4. Gene Kimmelman, co-director of Consumers Union,
publisher of Consumer Reports magazine commented, "This
potentially endangers whether consumers will get competi-
tion in the future . . . . A [permanent] stay at this point
would put a wrench into the entire procedure of bringing
competition to local phone markets." Id. See also Leslie
Cauley, Baby Bells, GTE to Fight Rules Aimed at Busting Local
Phone Monopolies, WALL ST.J., Aug. 29, 1996, at A3. "[P] hone
companies wouldn't be able to make a fair return on their
investment, perhaps forcing some to consider abandoning
investment in their local-phone networks." Id.
to be responsive to Congress' intentions stated in
the 1996 Act.'
IV. APPEAL TO THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
On September 27, 1996, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals granted a temporary stay of the
pricing provisions issued by the FCC.' 12 After oral
arguments were heard October 3, 1996, the court
granted a temporary stay of the contested provi-
sions"13 twelve days later based on its general ac-
ceptance of the arguments brought by the peti-
tioners, mostly state commissions and LECs.II 4
The court agreed that the case presented had on
its face sufficient merit and was persuaded that,
absent a stay, the petitioners and the public might
be harmed. 15 The court heard oral arguments
on January 17, 1997, but the stay remains in effect
pending a final decision on the merits.
The court noted that despite the different ap-
proaches, the majority of petitioners' objections
revolved around the FCC's pricing rules.116 One
of the pricing rules was based on the TELRIC"17
1"3 Iowa Util. Bd., 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) at 1361. The
pricing provisions of the stay refer to "§§ 51.501-51.515 (in-
clusive), 51.601-51-611 (inclusive), 51.701-51-717 (inclusive),
and to the default proxy range for line ports used in the de-
livery of basic residential and business exchange services es-
tablished in the FCC's Order on Reconsideration, dated Sep-
tember 27, 1996." Id. at n.3.
114 Id. at 1362. See also Leslie Cauley, Telecom Law Faces
Challenge in Court, Baby Bells, GTE to Fight Rules Aimed at Bust-
ing Local Phone Monopolies, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 1996, at A3.
"[F]ive of the seven Bells were planning to jointly challenge
the FCC's rules, with only NYNEX Corp. and Ameritech
Corp. still undecided." Id.
115 Iowa Util. Bd., 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) at 1365. The
court considered "the following four factors in determining
whether a stay is warranted: (1) the likelihood that a party
seeking the stay will prevail in the merits of the appeal; (2)
the likelihood that the moving party will be irreparable
harmed absent a stay; (3) the prospect that others will be
harmed if the court grants the stay; and (4) the public inter-
est in granting the stay." Id. at 1363. See Arkansas Peace Ctr.
v. Dep't of Pollution Control, 992 F.2d 145, 147 (8th Cir.
1993).
116 Iowa Util. Bd., 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) at 1362.
117 See First Report and Order, supra note 7, at para. 674.
The FCC uses the term TELRIC to describe their proposed
pricing methodology. Id. The term "long run" refers to a
period long enough so that all of a firm's costs become varia-
ble or avoidable. Id. "Incremental costs are the additional
costs (usually expressed as a cost per unit) that a firm will
incur as a result of expanding the output of a good or service
by producing an additional quantity of the good or service."
Id. at para. 675. "Incremental costs are forward looking in
the sense that costs are incurred as the output level changes
by a given increment." Id. "For example the incremental
cost of carrying an additional call from a residence that is
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method to calculate the costs which an incumbent
LEC incurs in making its facilities available to
competitors.118 The petitioners argued that the
TELRIC method underestimates their costs and
results in prices that are too low."19 They main-
tained that the prices would effectively require
them to subsidize their competitors and threaten
the viability of the LEC's own business."120 Fur-
thermore, the petitioners contended that the
TELRIC method does not consider or allow "em-
bedded" or "historical" costs, that is, those costs
incurred by the LEC in the past, when determin-
ing rates.' 2 1 The FCC pricing also assumes that
the LECs are using the most efficient telecommu-
nications technology available, not the technology
and equipment that the LEC actually may be us-
ing.122
A similar argument was persuasive to the court
regarding the petitioners' objections to the FCC's
proxy rates, the rates are to be used in the interest
of time expediency, because again, the rates "do
not accurately reflect [the incumbent LECs']
costs and are artificially low."' 2 3
The last of the petitioners' disputes regarding
the FCC's pricing methodology rests in the so-
called "pick and choose" rule, because "again,
price becomes a key issue."124 Essentially, the
pricing allows the LECs' competitors to "pick and
choose" the lowest-priced individual elements and
services among all prior approved agreements
already connected to the network to its end office is virtually
zero." Id. Embedded or accounting costs are costs that firms
incurred in the past for providing a good or service and are
recorded as past operating expenses and depreciation. Id.
"In competitive markets, the price of a good or service will
tend towards its long-run incremental cost." Id. "Adopting a
pricing methodology on forward looking, economic costs
replicates, to the extent possible, the conditions of a competi-
tive market. In addition, a forward-looking methodology
reduces the ability of an incumbent LEC to engage in anti-
competitive behavior." Id. at para. 679. The FCC contends
that in certain situations "it may not be possible for carriers
to prepare, or the state commission to review economic cost
studies within the statutory time frame for arbitration" and a
proxy pricing method might provide a faster and less costly
approach on an interim basis than a detailed forward looking
cost study. Id. at para. 767. The proxy ranges established by
the FCC will serve as presumptive ceilings and states may set
prices below those ceilings if the record before them sup-
ports a lower price. Id.
1us See also, Scott Ritter, FCC's Hundt Expresses Doubt On
Phone Rules, Courts Expected to Deny Bid for More Rivaby In the
Local Markets, Wall St. J., Nov. 11, 1996, at B9D. Chairman
Hundt "expressed optimism the states would adopt intercon-
nection policies not unlike those in the FCC's rules. The
FCC guidelines were based on forward-looking costs, rather
that historical, embedded costs that local phone companies
and demand that that price for the individual ele-
ments be available across the board. 25 The court
noted that the congressional preference for nego-
tiated agreements would be undermined because
an "agreement would never be finally binding,
and the whole methodology for negotiated and
arbitrated agreements would be thereby destabi-
lized."126
In granting its stay of the FCC's pricing meth-
odologies and the "pick and choose" rule, the
court agreed that the petitioner's arguments had
merit. Even though it noted that in general
"courts must give deference to an agency's reason-
able interpretation of an unclear statute," 27 the
court held that "the petitioners have a better than
even chance of convincing the court" that the
FCC's pricing rules are in conflict with the plain
meaning of the Act.128 Moreover, the court was
persuaded that the petitioners adequately demon-
strated they would be harmed by the application
of the FCC's proxy rates because competitors
would ultimately hold out for the lowest rates -
the FCC proxy rates.12 9
The court directly disagreed with the FCC's ar-
gument that in granting a stay the court would be
acting contrary to the public interest'"0 and as
stated by the intent of Congress in the 1996 Act,
to promote competition.' 3' The court noted that
prior to the FCC's intervention, several state com-
missions had successfully negotiated with incum-
argued were a more appropriate gauge for figuring pricing."
Id.





124 Iowa Util. Bd., 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) at 1362.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 1363.
127 Id. citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def.
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984). "If the intent of Con-
gress is clear, that is the end of the matter, for the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of Congress." Chevron at 842-43.
128 Iowa Util. Bd., 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) at 1365 (ex-
plaining that the court would not be bound by the Chevron
decision under these circumstances).
129 Id. at 1364. The court was persuaded by the peti-
tioner's evidence that the type of negotiations preferred by
Congress were breaking down due to the competitors' desire
to hold out for the FCC proxy rates. Id. Furthermore, due to
the time constraints of the 1996 Act, State commissions had
already felt obliged to impose the FCC's proxy rates on their
arbitration proceedings. Id.
130 Id. at 1365.
131 See generally 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West Supp. 1996).
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bent LECs to achieve acceptable access rates to
begin to allow competitors into the local mar-
ket. 132 The court believed a stay would preserve
the "continuity and stability of [the] regulatory
system - a system that has initially proved to be
successful."1 3 3 It dismissed the FCC's contention
that without its pricing regulations in effect, the
incumbent LECs would have superior bargaining
power in any negotiations. 1 3 4
V. IS THE PUBLIC INTEREST BEING
SERVED BY THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996?
Any discussion about the public interest must
begin with a definition of who or what comprises
the public and what constitutes the "public inter-
est." In the context of telephone service, the pub-
lic is composed of diverse markets. On one end
of the spectrum there are end users spread across
rural, thinly populated areas. At the other end is
the business community which drives the thriving
economy of this country, requiring a variety of de-
pendable and seamless telecommunications serv-
ices to provide goods and services in both the na-
tional and global economy. As a general rule,
businesses tend to be located where the popula-
tion is able to support a work force. As one kind
of "public" served by the telecommunications in-
dustry, it differs from the general public in terms
of having a larger need for basic services, but also
in terms of demanding economies of scale, cost
efficiencies and timely responses to particular
needs.135
It was Congress' clear intent in the Communi-
cations Act of 1934 to give the FCC sweeping au-
thority to regulate "a field of enterprise the domi-
nant characteristic of which was the rapid pace of
132 Iowa Util. Bd., 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) at 1365. The
court noted that some states, "Connecticut, Florida and Iowa
have established rates based on local conditions and are al-
ready opening up their local markets to competition under
both the federal Act and state statutes which foreshadow the
new federal law. Moreover, the FCC-imposed rate for Iowa is
substantially higher than the state-set rate which was based
on the full record from a contested case proceeding, while in
Florida, the FCC proxy rate is substantially lower than the
state-set rate. Id. at n.7.
133 Id. at 1365.
134 Id.
135 See generally supra note 89, Comments of Joseph R.
Bankoff of King and Spalding.
136 Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219
(1942) (describing the scope of the FCC's power).
its unfolding."136 The FCC was given a broad
mandate to regulate wire and radio communica-
tions in the "public interest, convenience and ne-
cessity."137 The power to legislate in the public in-
terest was described early on as "a supple
instrument for the exercise of discretion" by the
FCC which Congress charged to carry out its legis-
lative policy."158 In 1934 the Supreme Court af-
firmed the constitutionality of the FCC's power to
legislate in the public interest as providing suffi-
cient judicial constraints as to be judicially en-
forceable.139 The Court found that power to be
constrained by the requirement of adapting their
rules to the nation's needs in a "volatile changing
economy."1 40 The FCC is required to provide a
reasonable analysis that indicates prior policies
and standards are being "deliberately changed,
not casually ignored."'41
The 1996 Act mandated that competition be
brought to the local telephone communications
network.1 42 In promulgating rules to expedite
Congress' mandate, on the surface, the FCC has
met the legal requirements of acting in the public
interest. The BOCs, like AT&T until 1984, are not
going to want to give up their monopoly easily.
A. Competition
Now that much of the deregulatory dust has set-
tled following the court-ordered break-up of the
AT&T long distance monopoly in 1982, it has be-
come generally accepted that competition for all
telecommunications services is both desirable and
necessary, even on the local level. Competition is
held out as the answer to provide of the variety of
goods and services the public has come to expect
and want, at competitive prices.14 3 Congress man-
dated the promotion of competition in the Tele-
137 See supra note 3.
138 FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940)
(lacking judicially enforceable constraints on the FCC's au-
thority would render the "public interest" sufficiently vague
as to be unconstitutional).
139 Nat'l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 219.
140 American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe R.R. Co., 387 U.S. 397, 416 (1966).
141 Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d
841, 852 (10th Cir. 1971). (explaining that the court will
scrutinize closely the analytical bases for the choices made
and that the Commission provide sufficient analysis and ex-
planation for its decision).
142 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West Supp. 1996).
143 See First Report and Order supra note 7, para. 3.
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communications Act of 1996 with specific instruc-
tions about what markets should be opened up
and in a particular time frame. 1 4 4 In promulgat-
ing rules to expedite congressional intent, the
FCC acted in the public interest by deliberately
changing prior policies and standards in response
to changing technologies. The BOCs, by contrast,
are not interested in competition and want to
maintain their competitive advantage as long as
possible. The desire to maintain control of that
monopoly is driving the litigation before the
Eighth Circuit.
The sheer quantity of litigation engendered by
the interconnectivity provisions of the 1996 Act
point out serious flaws in its implementation. 1 4 5
The fact that the Eighth Circuit stayed several key
provisions, and that the stay has now been upheld
by Supreme Court Justices Clarence Thomas and
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 146 suggests one of the most
basic tenets of the 1996 Act, the interconnectivity
order, will be delayed for a substantial period of
time and competition on the local level will not
occur for at least several more years.14 7
The FCC based its controversial pricing provi-
sions on assumptions that do not accurately re-
flect current conditions within the LECs, namely
state-of-the-art switching and record keeping.14
At least several of the petitioners in the Eighth
Circuit argued that they cannot provide the serv-
ices for the prices set by the FCC because they
simply do not generate the efficiencies on which
the FCC based its pricing.-"
144 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West Supp. 1996).
145 Telecomm Roundtable, supra note 89, Comments of Wil-
liam B. Barfield of BellSouth Corp. (explaining that, "[t]he
FCC has turned this Bill on its ear.")
146 FCC v. Iowa Util. Bd., 117 S.Ct. 378 (1996). The FCC
made application to justice Thomas andJustice Ginsburg to
lift the stay issued by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit; both requests were denied. Id. FCC v.
Iowa Util. Bd., 117 S.Ct. 429 (1996).
147 Telecomm Roundtable, supra note 89, at 33, Comments
of William R. Barfiled of BellSouth Corp.
148 The new international standard is Signaling System 7
(SS7), a digital packet-switched network that is connected to
a telephone carrier's telephone switches that controls the
routing and accounting of calls, manages network resources
and supports the supply of information services. By 1991,
53.4% of BOC access lines were connected to SS7 equipped
switches and the conversion schedules project that BOCs and
major independent companies will serve almost all lines in
urban areas by SS7 switching by 1995. Bridger M. Mitchell
and Ingo Vogelsang, Expanded Competitiveness and Regulatory
Safeguards in Local Telecommunications Markets in DEREGULAT-
ING COMMUNICATIONS, THE BABY BELLS CASE FOR COMPETI-
TION AT 178 (Richard S. Higgins and Paul H. Rubin eds.
A second disputed area concerns the "embed-
ded" costs, which are the costs that the incumbent
LECs originally incurred in building their net-
works.15 0 In its regulations, the FCC is allowing
competitors to come in, use an incumbent LEC's
equipment, and pay only for the immediate ser-
vice, not for the original investment the LEC in-
curred in building its network.' 5 1 On its face, this
practice seems to border on a regulatory taking of
the incumbent LEC's property, but more impor-
tantly creates a strong disincentive for the LEC to
improve their networks or their technology. 5 2
It appears that the FCC, in anticipating the
technological future, 15 3 sought to encourage that
future by regulating the lower prices based on the
expected high efficiencies. In its discussion of
whether Congress intended national pricing
rules, the FCC justifies its position by carefully
crafting an argument about how the LECs have
no incentive, absent national rules, to encourage
competitors' entries into their local markets.' 5 4
In addressing the types of negotiation which
would facilitate interconnection, the FCC again
discussed how "state arbitration of interconnec-
tion agreements now and in the future will be ex-
pedited and simplified by a clear statement of
terms,"15 5 that statement being a minimum na-
tional price structure.15 6 The FCC continues to
emphasize the point that "more efficient competi-
tion will, in turn, benefit consumers." 5 7 The FCC
was aware that litigation would ensue and tried
crafting arguments specifically to prevent that sit-
1995).
149 Leslie Cauley and Bryan Gruley, Telecommunications:
Baby Bells Win Possible Delay Of Competition, WALL ST. J., Oct.
16, 1996, at BI.
150 Iowa Util. Bd., 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) at 1362.
151 Id.
152 Telecomm Roundtable, supra note 89, at 34, Comments
of Joseph R. Bankoff of King and Spalding.
15s United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 194-195
(D.D.C. 1982). "It is probable that, over time, the Operating
Companies will lose the ability to leverage their monopoly
power into the competitive markets from which they must
now be barred. This change could occur as a result of tech-
nological developments which eliminate the Operating Com-
panies' local exchange monopoly or from changes in the
structures of competitive markets. In either event, the need
for the restrictions ... will disappear, and the decree should
therefore contain a mechanism by which they may be re-
moved." Id.
154 See First Report and Order, supra note 7, at para. 55.





uation from occurring in every state. 15 8
Unfortunately, because the FCC tried to jump-
start competition before ensuring that all incum-
bent LECs possessed the assumed state-of-the-art
technology baseline, 159 it has fostered litigation
which has effectively brought the interconnection
process to a halt.16 0 In this situation, no one ben-
efits 6 1 by delays in achieving competition while
the finer points of the law are litigated. In a more
general sense, the FCC has acted contrary to the
public interest by allowing the legislation to be
stonewalled in the court system.
Although the regulatory process concerning in-
terconnection has been halted pending the out-
come of the Eighth Circuit's final decision, tech-
nological advances achieving competition
continue apace. The barrier to competition
based on interconnection at the local level ap-
pears to have been broken by AT&T's widely an-
ticipated announcement of its entry into local
markets based on wireless technology. 162 Accord-
ing to AT&T, the consumer interface would re-
main unchanged, but the connection from the
consumer's home or place of business would be
through the airwaves which will effectively cover
93% of the nation's population effectively replac-
ing local phone links.1 6 3 In creating its wireless
infrastructure, AT&T will undoubtedly invest sig-
nificant capital into placing this system into every
consumer's hands. This process, however, will still
be less costly than installing a hardwired system.
AT&T admits that putting this new infrastructure
in place will take some time, but Congress' basic
intent to introduce competition at the local level
will somehow prevail despite the Eighth Circuit,
because it appears that technology does have an-
swers and solutions heretofore unimagined. 164
B. The Incumbent LEC
Nevertheless, concern has been expressed by
various parties about what level of competition
they want to achieve, based on the 1996 Act. 165 If
a newcomer to a particular market were to be-
come the dominant carrier based on market
share, it would likely then be redesignated as the
incumbent LEC, a status that no company, new or
otherwise, would want.16 6 In fact, anticipating
that such a situation might happen, Congress pro-
vided for such redesignation in the 1996 Act.1 6 7
This part of the law itself provides a new, perhaps
unanticipated, barrier to competition, or at least
against a company's being too successful.16 8
The possible trend against competitive pres-
sures being brought about by deregulation could
also be illustrated through a comparison to other
industries which have been deregulated. In the
trucking, airline and power industries, initial re-
sponses to deregulation led to many new play-
ers. 169 Over the long term, however, many new-
comers failed, and were acquired by their
competitors, who became bigger and more domi-
nant than before deregulation.17 0 Therefore, it is
quite conceivable that Congress, in its attempt to
introduce more competition by deregulating the
telecommunications industry, will have actually
reduced competition in any particular market,
creating de facto monopolies which are subject to
less regulation than before the 1996 Act.
C. Global Access - Possible New Markets
Another area of competitive entry to LECs'
markets, with players who have enough capital to
invest heavily on infrastructure, is dependent
158 Id.
159 Supra note 116.
160 Supra note 109.
161 Telecomm Roundtable, supra note 89, at 35, Comments
of W. Douglas Hickey of US West Inc.
162 Mike Mills, Paving the Way With Wireless, Long-Distance
Giant AT&T Unveils Its Local-Market Strategy, WASH. PosT, Feb.
26, 1997, at C1I.
163 Id. AT&T purchased 222 licenses to use a small seg-
ment of the radio spectrum in federal auctions. At the time,
most analysts assumed AT&T would be using the licenses for
a new personal communications services. Id. at C12.
164 Id.
165 Telecomm Roundtable, supra note 89,at 34, Comments
of William B. Barfield of BellSouth Corp.
166 Id.
167 Id. . . . [U]nder the 1996 law, you'd be wary of the
degree of your own success as a competitive local exchange
carrier, because the last thing you'd want to do is obtain suffi-
cient market share and be reclassified as an incumbent." Id.
168 See 47 U.S.C.A. at § 251 (h) (1) (b) (West Supp. 1996).
169 Telecomm Roundtable, supra note 89, at 39, comments
of William E.Eason, Jr. of Scientific-Adanta Inc.
170 Id.
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upon the global marketplace and economy.17 ' Al-
ready alliances are forming with international
companies 172 which are expected to open the
telecommunications markets overseas, and which
also represent newly available resources for do-
mestic carriers who need to upgrade their own
networks and services continuously.1 7 3 These alli-
ances will provide American companies which
conduct international business with a seamless in-
ternational telecommunications interface.174 Pre-
sumably this would help such internationally ori-
ented companies generate American jobs and
thereby help add to the U.S. economy.'75 Many
companies have expressed the need to have stra-
tegic alliances with international suppliers for just
these reasons.
D. Costs of Public Interest
The United States itself spends almost $200 bil-
lion a year for long distance and local exchange
telecommunications services.1 7 6 Once the long
distance market was deregulated, a remarkable
transformation occurred in the long-distance in-
dustry. The general trend was expansion of the
overall market; as long-distance became cheaper
through deregulation, more people used it, and
used it more often. This model has inspired to-
day's fascination with introducing competition at
the local exchange level.
In one sense, the general public is already con-
vinced that increased local exchange usage is nec-
essary. The demand for additional telephone
lines to accommodate ubiquitous fax machines
and computer modems has led to new area codes
171 See generally Mike Mills, U.K. Firm Near a Deal To Buy
MCI; $20 Billion Merger Would Create Global Communications Ti-
tan, WASH. PosT, Nov. 2, 1996, at Al.
172 Christopher Boam, Giving the Phoenix Wings: The
Deutsche Telekom/France Telecom/Sprint Alliance, 5 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 73, 82-83 (1997) (explaining that British
Telecom would invest $4.3 billion in MCI in exchange for
20% of the company along with appropriate board represen-
tation. A second joint-venture company called Concert
would be created, 75.1% owned by BT and 24.9% owned by
MCI. The creation of Concert would allow BT and MCI to
offer global service quickly and cheaply.)
173 Id. "The MCI-BT merger . . . would mean a huge
cash infusion for MCI, which has all but completed investing
the $4.3 billion it got from BT in 1994. MCI could use the
money to more aggressively build local phone networks, as
well as upgrade its Internet and long distance fiber-optic net-
works." Id.
174 Telecomm Roundtable, supra note 89, at 35, Comments
of Sharon R.B. Case of Coca-Cola.
being added all over the country, because in many
places the available numbers keep being ex-
hausted. Consumers, both individually and in
business, need more and better services.
VI. THE INTRODUCTION OF
COMPETITION FOR LOCAL
EXCHANGE SERVICES
Irrespective of whether the FCC will prevail in
overturning the Eighth Circuit stay, will the bene-
fits Congress envisioned when it legislated the
1996 Act come to pass? Will the benefits of com-
petition result in the creation of competitive mar-
kets, reduce prices for telecommunications serv-
ices and further spur economic growth and
technological developments?' 7 7 Will sustained
competition in the local exchange market bring
about increased choices and a proliferation of ad-
vanced services waiting on the horizon?
Because of their great financial resources and
expertise, the largest telephone service providers
will be the first to enter the local exchange mar-
ket. In order for BOCs to enter the market, they
must first comply with an FCC fourteen point
competitive checklist. 78 The desire to exploit
the $100 billion-a-year local exchange market will
facilitate compliance with the checklist and as a
result, AT&T, Sprint, MCI and the BOCs will be
the first providers to enter the market. 79
During the transition period to a competitive
environment, federal and state regulators must re-
move the subsidies that have allowed millions of
Americans access to local service at less than it
costs the LECs to provide it.10 Although the FCC
175 Id.
176 MCI's Earnings Climbed 17 Percent in the 4th Quarter,
WASH. PosT, Jan. 31, 1996 at F3. MCI and AT&T share the
$70 billion long distance industry. Id. Mike Mills, Paving the
Way With Wireless, Long-Distance Giant AT&T Unveils Its Local-
Market Strategy, WASH. PosT, Feb. 26, 1997 at Cl1. AT&T bets
on wireless technology to enter the $100 billion a year local
telephone market. Id.
177 Supra note 53.
178 See supra 55, at 116 (explaining that BOCs must com-
ply with a competitive checklist in order to be granted § 271
authority to enter the long distance market).
179 Shannon Henry, Telecom Supercarriers Set to Battle for
your Business, WASH. TECH., Mar., 7, 1996. (explaining the po-
tential outcomes of the 1996 Act).
180 Mark Lander, Rising Phone Bills Are Likely Result of De-
regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1977, at Al. (explaining that
Federal and state regulators must strip away subsidies that for
decades have allowed millions of Americans to get local ser-
vice at or below cost).
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is dedicated to maintaining the status quo during
the transitional period, some experts believe a
temporary rate increase is an unavoidable first
step toward lower prices competition will bring in
the long run.18'
The second step will be rate reductions on the
order of 15-20% in the next three years accompa-
nied by a richer variety of services.'8 2 Along with
the lowering of rates, there will be a greater will-
ingness to customize services accompanied by bet-
ter customer service.a 3 Customers will choose
among telecommunications packages that include
local and long distance service, cellular phone
services, paging, Internet access and cable televi-
sion.18 4 Competition will be fierce at first with the
carrier's offerings bundled precisely to customer's
needs."a5 The offerings would be cross dis-
counted not only to lure the price conscious but
also those with complex communications
needs.8 6
Initially there will be a flurry of mergers,
buyouts and reselling as a expedient means of
gaining access to valuable services, the net result
being the formation of a handful of -supercar-
riers."18 7 Another concurrent development and
source of viable competition is the emergence of
the Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") and the
use of the Internet for telecommunications.18 8
ISPs are currently exempt from paying access
charges to local phone companies, and the LECs
want the ISPs to pay for this privilege.' 8" The FCC
has suggested that it will not impose access
charges on the new market. 90 Aside from the
BOCs and the major long distance carriers, there
are at least five hundred other long distance prov-
181 Id. (explaining that the F.C.C. is left with a dilema. It
can simply end the subsidies for the local phone companies
and risk a jarring disruption of the "universal service" tradi-
tion that enables 93% of American households to afford a
telephone or it can allow the phone companies to ease into
the world of pay-as-you-go competition by replacing a portion
of the subsidies with higher rates).
182 Telecomm Roundtable, supra note 89, at 30, Comments
Timothy C Reis of United Parcel Service (explaining the ef-
fects of the 1996 Act).
183 Telecomm Roundtable, supra note 89, at 30, Comments
of Sharon R.B. Case of Coca-Cola.
184 Katia Hetter, Dialing for Dollars Benefits, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Feb. 12, 1996 at 51.
185 Supra note 179.
186 Id.
187 In February of 1996, one week after the passage of
the 1996 Act, there was merger of U.S. West Media Group
with Continental Cablevision. Id. Continental is the nation's
third largest cable company and U.S. West one of the BOC.
iders, cable companies, satellite and electric utility
companies which have shown an interest in com-
peting for market share.191 With no infrastruc-
ture in place, reselling will be the basic mode of
entry to begin a strong facilities-based competi-
tion.192 The introduction and ability to launch a
wireless infrastructure as proposed by AT&T has
added yet another competitive force to an already
complex equation.19 3
Many consumers do not understand the differ-
ences between the long-distance choices and will
have much the same reaction with the introduc-
tion of competition at the local level. To this end,
many competitors will concentrate on increased
name recognition bringing with it the aura of reli-
ability that the newcomers will be lacking.'94 In
an attempt to preserve market share, the United
States Telephone Association, collectively repre-
senting the local telephone exchanges, has
launched a $7 million campaign praising the vir-
tues of "home town" service.' 95
VII. CONCLUSION
The reforms and goals of the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996 will bring about competition to
the local telephone monopoly. Because of the in-
herent advantages of the BOCs and major long
distance providers, that future will result in a
handful of "supercarriers" that each provide all
the telecommunications services any end-user
could envision. The first effects will mirror what
happened in the airline, banking and long dis-
tance industries after deregulation producing a
handful of supercarriers and the death of once
Together they serve 18.1 million customers. Id.
188 Mark Rockwell, Acting on reform: FCC is put to the test,
COMM. WK., Jan. 6, 1997 (explaining that the LECs want to
get the ISPs to pay for calls).
189 Id. (explaining access charges were waived in the
mid-80s to allow the ISPs, then called "enhanced service
providers" to develop).
190 See supra note 4.
191 Supra note 179.
192 Telecomm Roundtable, supra note 89, at 33, Comments
of Ellen A. D'Amato of Sprint Corp. (explaining that to ob-
tain core business in the local exchange market you have to
resell. Immediately investing billions of dollars into a new
infrastructure isn't a sound method of entry).
193 Supra note 162.
194 Telecomm Roundtable, supra note 89, at 35-36, Com-
ments of Sharon R.B. Case (explaining that Coca-Cola will
probably go with known names due to reliability issues.)
195 Carolyn Hirschman, Waging War, Public Opinion Be-
comes A Battleground for LECs, TELEPHONY, Mar. 11,1996, at 58.
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successful companies. As the industry recovers
from this first round of competition, another crop
of "boutique" carriers will emerge providing more
unique and diversified services for customers
whose needs extend into other areas, for exam-
ple, carriers that provide a complement of bank-
ing services, stock transactions, recorded music,
radio, newspaper and magazine subscriptions
along with basic local and long distance services
for a monthly fee.
Congress and the FCC probably considered
these types of future uses when they directed the
industry to continue to move towards a more com-
petitive environment. In the future, we will need
to reconsider whether these newly combined
functions will properly be overseen by the FCC as
currently structured.
If competition is the answer, the FCC has
served the public interest well in promulgation of
its regulations. It has created a framework that
encourages competition. Whether or not the
BOCs are successful in temporarily staying the
pricing provisions of Sections 251 and 252, will
not stop competition with a $100 billion market
waiting to be exploited. As new and unimagined
technologies and markets develop, the law will
move and change with it. Perhaps new monopo-
lies will develop and need to be dismantled as a
result. But at the heart of any legislation will be
the idea that legislated competition is a basic eco-
nomic necessity.
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